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Behavior-Based Covert Channel in Cyberspace
Daryl Johnson, Peter Lutz, and Bo Yuan
Department of Networking, Security, and Systems Administration
B. Thomas Golisano College of Computing and Information Sciences
Rochester Institute of Technology
Rochester, New York 14623
{daryl.johnson, peter.lutz, bo.yuan}@rit.edu
Many covert channels take advantages of weaknesses, flaws, or unused data
fields in network protocols. In this paper, a behavior-based covert channel, that
takes advantages of behavior of an application, is presented along with a formal
definition in the framework of finite state machines. The behavior-based covert
channel is application specific and lies at the application layer of the network
OSI model, which makes the detection of this type of covert channel much
more difficult. A detailed sample implementation demonstrates an example of
this type of covert channel in the form of a simple online two-person game.The
potential of this type of covert channel is also discussed.
Keywords: Covert channels, data hiding, security, information warfare.
1. Introduction
According to Lampson, a communication channel is covert if it is neither
designed nor intended to transfer information.1 A covert channel enables
information exchanges that violate security policies. There are two main
types of covert channels, storage channels and timing channels. In a stor-
age channel, a share storage media is employed by the two users to share
information. By assigning read or write permissions to a file, one user can
send a bit of information to the other user. With a synchronized clock, a
user can signal the other user a bit of information via timing certain events.
Such a covert channel is called a timing channel. Though covert channels
are concerned with information sharing between unauthorized users on the
same secure system initially, many convert channels have been identified
between systems connected via a network such as the Internet.
Girling first identified three areas in networking protocols that are po-
tentially employed to form covert channels: the address field, the length of
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a data block, and the time between successive transmissions.2 In the paper,
Girling also demonstrated a covert channel to leak information by send-
ing data to different destinations. Handel and Standford discussed possible
covert channels that may exist at different layers of the OSI model.3 Row-
land presented a practical implementation of a covert channel in embedding
information in the TCP/IP header.4 Cabuk, Brodley and Shields designed
an IP timing channel for networked systems.5 Yuan and Lutz realized a
covert channel in a modified TFTP protocol with varying packet sizes.6 Xu
implemented a covert channel using the TCP protocol by segmenting TCP
data streams.7
Recently, Murdoch and Zielinkski constructed a covert channel for col-
lusion in an online computer game.8 In their covert channel, choices of dif-
ferent equivalent moves are used to encode information. Hernandez-Castro,
et al., devised a covert channel via modulating available moves at each
turn in the game Go.9 These recent development in convert channels differs
dramatically from traditional covert channel study. Storage network covert
channels exploit many features or defects in network protocols; network
timing channels rely on timing of packet arrivals to encode hidden data.
Game-based covert channels, however, operate at the application level.
They are application specific, not protocol specific. We call this type of
covert channel behavior-based. By purposely altering the internal states or
behavior of an application, one can leak information between two parties.
This type of behavior-based covert channel has these advantages. First, it
does not rely on a particular network protocol or its implementation, which
implies that it is more difficult to detect and prevent. Secondly, it is not a
timing channel; i.e., there are no clock synchronization issues. Thirdly, it is
application specific. One has to understand the application completely in
order to detect such covert channels and understand messages transmitted
on them. Furthermore, as online applications or games proliferate on the
Internet, there are thousands of them that can be potentially adopted to
carry covert channels.
In the next two sections, a formal definition of behavior-based covert
channels is given and its characteristics are discusses. In section 4, a simple
example of this new type of covert channel is presented. A protocol to realize
the covert channel is also specified. Section 5 discusses covert channels in
other games. Finally, in Section 6, the potential use of this type of covert
channel in botnets is considered.
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2. Covert Channels between Finite State machines
Suppose there are two finite state machines A and B that are connected
via a communication channel, such as the Internet. A and B can exchange
information freely without loss. A third finite state machine C is an eaves-
dropper that knows all information about the finite state machines A and
B , their transition functions, states, output functions, etc. In cyberspace,
finite state machines A and B can be considered as two online applications;
C can be an eavesdropper who can capture all information exchanged be-
tween A and B. It is assumed that C knows alphabets, states, and normal
transition functions of both machines A and B. With this setting, there
are several areas that A and B can take advantage of to establish covert
channels so as to evade C.
• Type I: timing channel.
A can send a message at different time intervals or synchronized
with some signal or event. The timing of the messages could carry
information. The timing channel specified by Cabuk, et al5 is an
example this type.
• Type II: modulating the message delivery between A and B.
A can fragment a message into several short messages, and vari-
ations in the length of the messages can carry information. The
sender can also take advantage of protocols employed for deliver-
ing messages to form covert channels. Covert channels devised by
Handel,3 Rowland,4Yuan and Lutz,6 and Xu7 can be considered
belonging to this type.
• Type III: modulating states of the recipient finite state machine.
A, knowing the state of B, can send an input to B knowing the
state transition that B will take and the output B will generate; A
can then send another input to B causing B to generate a different
output. By altering B’s outputs, A can signal a bit of information
to B. Covert channels based on the games Connect-4,8 Go,9 and
Kuhn Poker10 belong this type.
• Type VI: modifying the transition function.
An eavesdropper only knows the transition functions of machines
A and B during normal operation. One can devise that a totally
different transition function is used when certain states or a se-
quence of states are reached. The sequence of states can be used as
authentication verification to the sender or receiver. In this paper,
a simple example of this type of covert channel is implemented.
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A behavior-based covert channel is then defined as a communication channel
achieved by modulating the internal states of the sender or receiver via
purposely selecting certain inputs to the systems. Type III and IV covert
channels specified above are behavior-based.
3. Covert Channel Characteristics
The effectiveness of a covert channel can be characterized by the following
two factors:
• Bandwidth or capacity
• Secrecy or covertness
These two factors are often opposed to one another. The lower the band-
width in a covert channel, the more secrecy or “covertness” the channel has,
and hence the more difficult it is to detect it. A high bandwidth implies less
secrecy for the covert channel and greater ease of detection. Other factors
can be considered such as false positive rates for covert channel authentica-
tion, the secrecy of the message participants or “linkness” (i.e. the ability to
determine who the communicants are), etc. A finite state machine (FMS)
is a quintuple (Σ,S,s0,δ,F ), where
(1) Σ is the input alphabet (a finite, non-empty set of symbols).
(2) S is a finite, non-empty set of states.
(3) s0 is an initial state, an element of S.
(4) δ is the state-transition function: δ : S × Σ → S.
(5) F is the set of final states, a (possibly empty) subset of S.
For a covert channel H that modulates the state of a FSM, at any given
time t, the bandwidth of the covert channel is
log2|{δ(st, σ)|σ ∈ Σ}|,
where st is the state at time t. Thus, the bandwidth for the covert channel
can be defined as
B = mint∈T {log2|{δ(st, σ)|σ ∈ Σ}|},
where T is the time when the covert channel is in action, called the longevity
of the channel H. Note that T may not be infinite. Suppose Σc is the
alphabet set of the covert channel. Then the secrecy of the covert channel
H, S(H), can be defined as
S(H) = 1− log2Σc
B
.
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S(H) measures how much of the covert channel bandwidth is utilized. When
H utilizes the maximum bandwidth, the secrecy of H is minimal; and when
H utilizes the minimum bandwidth, the secrecy of H is maximal. Note that
in general, covert channel secrecy H can be defined as
S(H) = 1− covert channel bandwidth
carry channel bandwidth
.
4. A Simple Online Board Game: Magneton
In this section we demonstrate a covert channel that modulates states of
a deterministic machine with modification of transition function to enable
covert communication.
Magneton is a 8x8 board game, one player takes an “O” or “X”, while
the other takes the other piece. The game starts when one player places
a piece on any box on the board. The other player does the same. The
players take in alternate turns until there are four consecutive pieces of the
same kind connected in one of four directions: horizontal, vertical and the
two diagonals. When this occurs, the game is over. When a piece is placed
on the board, the board will automatically adjust the positions of existing
pieces following the rule that the closest neighbor piece of the same kind
in all directions will be repelled to the furthest position possible (stopping
at the board edge or another piece); and the closest pieces of a different
kind will be attracted to the positions next to the placed piece. At any
given time in a game, the state of the game is completely determined by
the move selection. Thus, if two sides of the game agree upon a protocol
for handshaking to establish a covert channel and an information encoding
scheme, information can be exchanged through the covert channel, while
on the surface a normal game is played. The following section describes an
example of such protocol.
4.1. A Protocol for Convert Communication
4.1.1. Handshake
A particular state of the game can be pre-determined as the start of a covert
channel. In the sample implementation, when a remote player places the
first four moves at the four corners of the board in counter clockwise order
starting from the top left corner, the server will recognize the player and
start a covert channel.
June 18, 2009 10:35 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in ISKE2009˙final
6
4.1.2. Labeling Moves
The purpose of labeling moves is to distinguish moves so that the different
choices of a move may carry information. Suppose at the t-th move there
is a total number N(t) of all possible legal moves. Thus, each move can po-
tentially carry log2N(t) bits of information. Label each possible move from
1 to N(t). For example, go through each unoccupied box on a board in row
by row fashion. Ignore illegal moves. Label all possible moves sequentially.
In a simple game like Magneton, label each unoccupied box from low to
high in rows and, then in columns. A more complex game, like Chess, in
which not all pieces are “equal”, would require a more complex numbering
system.
4.1.3. Encoding
The encoding is to represent an alphabet (i.e., a finite set of symbols) with
possible moves at a given point in the game. ASCII code is an example of
such an alphabet. In this sample implementation, it is assumed that the
size of the alphabet is always smaller than N(t) at the any given time t in
the game. Generally speaking, the encoding process is a function, E from
the alphabet to the set of all possible moves.
In the case of the ASCII codes of all capital English letters, this is an
example of such an encoding: E(i) = i− 65 where i ∈ [65, 66, ..., 90], which
are all capital letters from A to Z, a subset of ASCII. Note that when N(t)
is much bigger than the number of symbols when t is small, the above
function is biased to using lower move numbers for encoding. This may
reveal the existence of the covert channel. To avoid that, one can select a
move from equivalent high move numbers randomly by employing the mod
operation. Here is an example: E(i) = i−65+26∗Random.next(N(t)/26).
4.1.4. Decoding
The decoding process is the opposite of encoding. It is a function, D, from
the set of all possible move to the alphabet set D : [0, N(t) − 1] → Σ. In
example of English capital letters, D(i) = 65+i%26. where i ∈ [0, N(t)−1].
5. Covert Channels Based on Other Games
Hernandez-Castro, et al.9 demonstrated hiding information in the ancient
board game ’Go’. By purposely selecting moves between the best and second
best, one can encode one bit of information per move. This can also be done
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in Chess or any strategic person to person board game. This type of data
hiding is more in the realm of steganography than covert channels, as all
moves in the game can be recorded.
Covert channels can be built in two person games as demonstrated in
the previous section. With two player games at least one of the players is
a communicant and perhaps both. An observer could be the recipient in
a one-way delivery and if the number of observers are small and traceable
they can be included in the suspect list.
Massively multi-user online role playing games, MMORPG, are prolif-
erating on the Internet. They can potentially be a vast venue for covert
channels. The advantages of MMORPG are that the communicants are
more difficult to identify and the list of suspects are prohibitively large
to investigate. In a two player game there are a limited number of game
interactions to examine for covert characteristics. In a MMORPG with
hundreds, thousands or even tens of thousands of users performing a large
number of actions with a huge number of objects, the ability to thoroughly
examine all of them for evidence of a covert channel is daunting. Online
virtual worlds such as Second Life11 have similar environment to massively
multiuser online games; they are also potentially fertile ground for covert
communications.
6. Potential Use in Botnets
The weakness in IRC-based botnet command and control is that all bot
nodes need to connect back to a centralized IRC server, which becomes
immediately noticeable due to the amount of identical destination network
traffic.12 The weakness in traditional peer-to-peer based botnets is that
they need to use a specific protocol, which is also detectable due to the
infrequency of that protocol’s use in normal traffic.13 To avoid detection, the
authors believe, a future generation of botnets may employ covert channel
technology to command and control communications. Since online games,
virtual worlds, etc. are prevalent on the Internet, the authors predict that
a future generation of botnets will employ some forms of covert channels
using these environments as carriers.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, behavior-based covert channels are first defined; a simple
example in the form of an online two-person game is also presented. Un-
like other types of network protocol-based covert channels, behavior-based
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covert channels rely on the behavior of applications, and thus are at the
application layer of OSI model. These channels modulate the behavior of
an application to encode messages and do not depend on flaws or vulner-
abilities in lower layer protocols. As the Internet becomes ingrained into
our way of life, and with an increasing number of online applications being
created every day, this type of covert channel will be employed by malicious
software for malware updates and command and control. It may become
the battleground of information warfare in cyberspace in near future.
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